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ABSTRACT
We consider the transitions among intragenerational and alternative intergenerational
financing and liquidity risk-sharing mechanisms, in an Overlapping Generations
model with endogenous levels of long-lived investments. The existence and
characterization of a Self-Sustaining Mechanism, stable across generations, are
established.  The long-run equilibrium outcome, in a Proposal Game across
generations, is shown to depend on the risk-aversion and propensity for early
liquidity needs of the agents.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Models of intertemporal liquidity risks, or "preference shocks" - developed in Bryant [1980]
and further examined in the works of Diamond and Dybvig [1983], Bhattacharya and Gale [1987],
and Jacklin [1987] among others - have recently been extended to the realm of ongoing dynamic
overlapping generations (OLG) economies; see Bencivenga and Smith [1991], Qi [1994], Fulghieri
and Rovelli [1993] and Dutta and Kapur [1994]. These models may be used to evaluate the
essential tradeoffs which arise in two distinct areas of current debate. The first is on the evaluation
of alternative (or possibly complementary) arrangements for the monetary system, for example the
relative merits of a market-value-based vs. an intermediated banking system. The second
interpretation, clearly requiring a considerably longer definition of the time unit, pertains to the
debate on the viability and desirability of differing social security (pension) systems,  and in
particular the choice between Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) versus Funded or Capital-reserve  systems
(e.g. Boldrin and Rustichini, 1995). Our paper considers the latter set of tradeoffs in an OLG model
outside of long-run steady states.
In our paper, agents choose among intertemporal liquidity-sharing or insurance
mechanisms, in an OLG economy in which the capital stock is possibly longer-lived than agents’
lives.  We focus on the comparisons between “Banking” or PAYG systems, of both an intra- and
inter-generational nature, versus Stock Market based in er-generational financial systems. The
essential tradeoffs across these institutional mechanisms arise from the need for financial contracting
to provide agents with liquidity insurance, related to the uncertainty regarding their preferences for
their intertemporal allocation of consumption1. Such preference shocks, coupled with real
investment opportunities that are long-lived and technologically illiquid, create a demand for interim
stock markets, or financial intermediaries and contracts such as deposits withdrawable (fully or
partially) on demand.
In dynamic OLG economies, there is in addition the possibility of designing contracts (or
mechanisms) for sharing such liquidity risk across generations, taking advantage of the "life cycle"
structure to the demand for savings of each generation. With the long horizons envisioned, one may
think of events such as uncertain workers’ disability as a source of early withdrawal demand. In
recent papers, by Qi [1994], Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993], and Dutta and Kapur [1994], alternative
institutional arrangements for such intertemporal consumption-smoothing and liquidity risk-sharing
mechanisms, within and across generations, have been examined and compared.
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Under some assumptions, in particular the restriction of the analysis to steady states only,
both Qi [1994] and Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993] show that there exist intergenerational financial
intermediation contracts that can attain the Golden Rule (Phelps, 1961) levels of investment and
consumption-smoothing. The paper of Fulghieri and Rovelli, and the later work of Bhattacharya
and Padilla [1996], also focus on the comparison of intergenerational Banks versus Stock Markets
for investments that are long-lived in nature. In contrast to the earlier models, which focus either on
a static economy (Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987) or on intra-generational mechanisms only
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991), Fulghieri and Rovelli find that stock markets result (in steady state)
in underinvestment in he long-lived technology, relative to the Golden Rule optimum, without any
investment in short-term liquid technologies or early liquidation2. This occurs essentially owing to
the incompleteness of contracts for resource transfers across generations, which in a stock market
economy can take place only through real investments in long-lived technologies and bilateral
trading at their interim market valuations.
In all of the above mentioned papers, the analysis of the functioning of intermediaries and
stock markets is confined to steady states, in which the inheritance of a stationary level of
investment by prior generations is taken as given. However, given the endowment structure in these
models, this is a restrictive assumption, especially vi  à vis the first generation which only has its
initial endowment to start a resource-transfer cum liquidity-insurance scheme. While Qi [1994]
briefly examines this issue (see his Propositions 5 and 6), his analysis is focused on PAYG systems
only, rather than on the choices among alternative risk sharing mechanisms.
More specifically, the following questions remain unanswered: given initial conditions, is it
possible to predict which allocational mechanisms would be chosen by the generations present, and
would the same choice be repeated by the subsequent generations, i.e., be intergenerationally stable
or Self-Sustaining? For example, consider the three institutional mechanisms which we shall analyze
below: (i) Intragenerational Bank (B), (ii) Intergenerational Banking (IB) and (iii) Intergenerational
Stock Market (SM). Suppose these may be ranked in a particular way by the steady state welfare
criterion. Then, is it necessarily true that, when the issues related to (a) transition to the steady state,
and (b) non-cooperative intergenerational choices are taken into account, the most efficient steady
state allocational mechanism would indeed be chosen and be intergenerationally self-sustaining?  We
seek to address these questions in this paper.
In defining our notions of inter-generational choices over mechanisms for financing of
investment and consumption smoothing, we shall not be employing notions such as the Core, whose
vapplicability to the OLG setting is dubious at best. As Esteban [1986] and Esteban and Millan
[1990] have shown, even when the Golden Rule allocation does impr ve the welfare of the first
generation (the Samuelson, 1958, case of Gale, 1973), it is not in the intergenerational Core (never
for a single commodity setting)3. Fortunately, as Esteban and Sakovics [1993] have emphasized,
negative results like those mentioned above do not imply that intergenerational transfer mechanisms
become infeasible. Society may cope with such a conundrum, created by the "not in the Core"
result, by restricting the language or strategy space of intergenerational proposals for choosing its
Institutional Mechanisms for intergenerational reallocations. In the context of the Esteban and
Sakovics model, of a pure-exchange OLG environment with agents' endowments tilted to the early
period(s) of life, they argue that in a time-stationary model the appropriate notion of an Institutional
proposal is that of a time-stationary transfer scheme, from each current and future generation when
young to its preceding generation when old. Institutions survive if and only if they constitute
Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) (Selten, 1975) in such an intergenerational proposal game. A
similar restriction is employed by Boldrin and Rustichini [1995], in their modelling of inter-
generational social security schemes versus intra-generational accumulation of short-lived
investments.
In our model below, we define the concept of a Self-Sustaining investment and consumption
allocation Mechanism, using restrictions motivated by analogous considerations. The spirit of these
is that proposals that make later generations strictly worse off than the proposing one are not
allowed. Such a restriction may arise spontaneously for market-based mechanisms, or be a result of
societal Norms embodied in a legislated Pay As You Go (PAYG) mechanism such as IB. In
particular, we restrict the set of proposals by each generation to be one of the three Institutions that
were indicated above: Transition to Steady-State of Intergenerational Banking (TIB),
Intergenerational Stock Market (SM), and Intragenerational Banking (B) (The first of these takes
into account the lack of inherited prior capital investments for the first generation). Some  of these
proposals may require that an older and a younger generation agree on the "sharing" of the inherited
capital stock plus the endowment of the young. Hence, each stage game in our model is one of
Proposals and Counter-Proposals by  the two overlapping generations, unlike in Esteban and
Sakovics [1993] where only young propose transfers to the currently old.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set out the basic model and delineate
the Golden Rule and other steady state allocations under the three alternative institutional
arrangements of B, IB, and SM. The dynamics of transition to these steady states, and the ranking
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of welfare levels attainable under each alternative institutional mechanism ( TIB, SM, B), taking
transition into account, are the foci of Section III. Intergenerational Proposal Games over these
(transition) Institutions and their subgame perfect equilibria, which we term intergenerationally Self-
Sustaining Mechanisms, are described and characterized in Section IV. In Section V we conclude
with a discussion of our results in the context of recent literature and with suggestions for further
research.
The major results that emerge from the analysis in the paper are the following. First, we
point out that there exists a feasible stationary consumption path (TIB) such that capital
accumulation along that path will lead, within a finite horizon, to the Golden Rule steady state
optimal allocation. Furthermore the consumption levels attained along this path ensure that the
welfare of each generation involved in the transition s ictly exceeds that attainable from any
intragenerational mechanism4. Second, we show that there exists a faster one-shot transition to the
steady  state intergenerational stock market (SM) allocation (Fulghieri and Rovelli, 1993)5. Third
we prove that a transition to SM that benefits the proposing current young, which exists unless they
are extremely risk averse, must involve strictly rationing the participation of the concurrent
preceding generation in the initial market (only). Fourth,  we prove that under reasonable parameter
values, there exists an intergenerational conflict in any stage game. Specifically, at any time, the
currently young may stand to gain by proposing a (rationed and immediate) transition to the
stationary intergenerational stock market allocation (SM), whereas the currently  middle-aged are
made strictly worse off, relative to the "slowest turnpike" allocation (TIB), from accepting such a
proposal. Finally, in the last step we delineate how this conflict may be resolved, in the sequence of
equilibria of the intergenerational proposal games across overlapping generations.
The equilibrium outcome of the intergenerational proposal games depends crucially on the
relative expected utility  payoff(s) of the middle-aged generation(s) from their rationed transition to
the stock market (SM), versus their fallback option of doing intragenerational liquidity risk-sharing
(B), based on their inherited endowment net of prior payout obligations. It turns out that the
currently middle-aged generation(s) are better off from their fallback option (B), relative to the
constrained (for them only) transition to SM proposed by their “children”, if and only if (i) the
proportion of the generation requiring early liquidity (withdrawal) is small, and (ii) agents in the
generation are ex ante highly risk-averse (or averse to unsmoothed consumption profiles). If either
of these conditions on agents’ ex ante characteristics is not satisfied then, and only then, the stock
market (SM) institutional arrangement (which is always suboptimal relative to IB in the steady
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state) becomes the unique subgame - and “trembling-hand” perfect (Selten, 1975) equilibrium of the
intergenerational proposal games6.
II. THE MODEL AND STATIONARY ALLOCATIONS
II.A Optimal Allocations and Intermediated Outcomes
We consider an extended version of the overlapping generation (OLG) model of
Samuelson [1958], that was first advanced by Bryant [1980].  Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2,
..., ¥.  Each generation consists of a continuum of agents of unit measure. An agent born at
time point t ³ 0 is alive at time point (t+1), and possibly also at time point (t+2). Each
generation is endowed with one unit of the single commodity, spread equally across its
members, at birth; this may be thought of as labor income or prior savings. To simplify matters,
we assume that an agent born at t only wishes to consume from his savings at time-point (t+1)
if he is an early dier, or at time-point (t+2) if she is a late dier. Such simple ex post corner
preferences, introduced by Diamond and Dybvig [1983], imply that the allocations produced
by intragenerational stock markets and banking systems coincide, provided market
participation is suitably restricted; see Jacklin [1987], and Bhattacharya and Gale [1987].
Agents become early or late diers with probabilities e nd (1-e) respectively. These
events are independent across the continuum of agents in each generation, so that a proportion
(1-e) of agents born at time  t  is alive at time  (t+2), when they die. Thus, the ex ante
expected utility of a representative agent of generation t is given by:
t , ,V  = U( ) + (1- )U( )e eC Ct t1 2 (1)
where { }C Ct t, ,,1 2 are the (certain) allocations of consumption to early and late diers of
generation t, respectively. The utility function  U(.)  is assumed to be strictly increasing and
concave, with U’(0) = ¥.
There are two investment technologies in the model. The first is long-lived with constant
returns to scale: investment of I t at time t returns RI t,  > 1 , at time (t+2). The second
technology is that of storage, without any loss or depreciation, between time points t to (t+1).
The long-lived investment  I t  can also be liquidated at time (t+1) to yield Q L t+1 , where 0 £ Q
£ 1,  and 0 £ L t+1 £ I t  ;  we assume Q = 1 , so that early liquidation and storage technologies
are  equivalent7.
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The Golden Rule (Phelps, 1961) stationary optimal intergenerational investment and
consumption plan thus solves the problem:
{ } [ ]
*
, , ,
, ,V  ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
º + -Max C C
I L C C
t t
t t t t1 2
1 21e e U  U (2)
s.t.: e e C  Ct t t t t tR I L L I t- - - -+ - £ + - + - "1 1 2 2 2 11 1, ,( ) ( ) , , (2.a)
0  L   It t£ £ £+1 1 (2.b)
As shown, for example, in Fulghieri and Rovelli (1993, Proposition 1), the solution to this
problem is characterised by full investment of the initial endowment of each new generation, no
liquidation of invested capital, and a level of consumption for early and late diers which is
constant and equal to R. Furthermore, Qi [1994], Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993], and Dutta and
Kapur [1994] give the conditions under which the Golden Rule allocation may be implemented
by an intergenerational banking system. These results are summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. (a) (Fulghieri and Rovelli 1993).The Golden Rule (Stationary) Optimal
Intergenerational Allocation Rule, which maximizes (2) subject to (2.a) and (2.b), is given by:
t
*
t
*
,1
*
,
*I  = 1 , L  = 0 , C = C = R , t .t t 2 "
(b) (Qi 1994, Fulghieri and Rovelli 1993, and Dutta and Kapoor 1994). If agents/depositors
can be subject to a No Redepositing Condition within (and across) banks, then a single
welfare-maximizing bank (or equivalently, many representative competing banks) would, in
equilibrium, offer each generation the deposit contract: It   i  deposits leads to withdrawal
rights RIt  at time (t+1) or time (t+2), at the choice of the depositor. Furthermore, all agents
born at t would deposit all their initial endowment in banks, which would invest it (It =1) in
long-lived investments only, without early liquidation. Thus intergenerational banking (IB)
would implement the Golden Rule optimum. Hence in particular:
C C Rt i
IB
t i, ,
*= =  ,     { }i Î "    t12, ,
(c) If redepositing after early withdrawal by agents is not monitorable (indistinguishable from
an initial deposit), especially if done across banks, but depositing at one bank by another can
be prohibited, then ex ante Bertrand competition among banks would lead to the outcome:
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depositing I t=1 by each depositor of each generation t confers her with withdrawal rights
CU1 at time (t+1) or C
U
2  at time (t+2), where these satisfy (suppressing the t-subscript):
C CU U1 2 < R < , (4.a)
( )2   C CU U1 2£ (4.b)
e e C  C1 2
U U+  (1- ) =R (4.c)
Proof. See either Qi, Fulghieri and Rovelli, or Dutta and Kapur.
Remark. The Golden Rule optimum  is,  of course,  strictly  valid  as a solution concept only
when t Î{-¥, ...,-1 , 0 , 1, ..., ¥} since, for example, if  t Î { 0, 1, ..., ¥},  and  I 1 = 1 and L 1 =
0, then the early diers of generation 0 will obtain consumptionC0 1 0, = . These issues raise
questions about the transition to these stationary optimal allocations, which we discuss in the
next section. The notion of a competitive banking system is also not unambiguous in an OLG
setting, and one may think instead of the resulting allocations as arising from a legislated
allocation mechanism.
In contrast,  the constrained optimal intragenerational allocation, solves the problem:
[ ]V    U(C )  + (1- )U(C )
, , ,
1 2º
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
Max
I L C C1 2
e e (3)
s.t.: 0  C   L,1£ £e (3.a)
0  (1- )C   R(I-L),2£ £e (3.b)
0  I  1.£ £ (3.c)
The solution to this problem is characterized by Diamond and Dybvig [1993], who also show
that this allocation may be implemented with a single welfare-maximizing bank or several
(representative) competing banks who are Bertrand Competitors and obtain clienteles of
strictly positive measure. The latter result assumes no interim trading of assets across
competing banks at the interim period; see Bhattacharya and Gale [1987].
Proposition 2. (Diamond and Dybvig 1993). The Optimal Intragenerational Allocation Rule,
which maximizes in (3) subject to (3.a) to (3.c), is given by:
I  = 1,  ¢ ¢U (C )  = RU (C ),1 2   C L C R L
_
/ ; 
_
 (
_
) / ( )1 2 1 1= = - -e e
xFurthermore, in a competitive intragenerational banking system equilibrium, deposit
contracts of the form { deposit I at time t implies withdrawal rights C C IB1 1=  or C C I
B
2 2= ,
at times (t + 1) or (t + 2) respectively} would prevail, leading to expected utility V VB = ,
and each depositor would deposit I = 1 at one (or many) bank(s), and each bank would invest
its deposits in short-term (early liquidation) and long-term investments in the proportions L
and 1 -L  , respectively.
Proof. See Diamond and Dybvig [1983]8.
The following implications of Proposition 2 are straightforward.
Corollary 1. For all e > 0 , the expected utility VB of an agent in the optimal
intragenerational allocation is strictly less than its level V* at the Golden Rule
intergenerational optimum.
Proof. Since  C C
_
,
_
1 2 0
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
>   and hence L Î (0,1), given U'(0) = ¥, we have
( )1 < = L +R(1-L)  < R,e e C C1 21+ -
whereas C C R1 2
* *= = , from which the conclusion follows using Jensen's inequality.     QED.
Corollary 2. (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983)  If  U(Ci ), i Î {1,2}, has its Relative Risk Aversion
Coefficient uniformly strictly greater than unity (that for logarithmic utility), then
1 <   R,   C C1 2< <
implying: e  < L  < 1.
We should briefly mention the al ernatives to the existence of bank-type intermediaries
(and "unconditional" withdrawal rights) in this setting. The extreme one is that of intra- and
inter-generational Autarky, under which each agent would invest I=1 when young, and
consume  CA1 1=  if she is an early dier, and C R
A
2 =  if she is a late dier, with expected utility:
A
1
A
2
AV   U(C )  + (1- )U(C )º e e  , (5)
 where it is obvious that:  A *V   V  < V ,£  with the first inequality also strict unless U(C) =
log(C),  since { L = e, C1 = 1, C2 = R} is always feasible under intragenerational banking.
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A less extreme comparison is  with an institution often analyzed in "standard" financial
modelling: the Intragenerational Stock Market. If individuals still invest on their own, but can
sell their long-term investments I t at a linear price  p It t+1  at time (t+1), then it turns out that
the interim value-maximizing consumption-investment outcome will be the same under
intragenerational stock markets as under Autarky; see Bhattacharya and Gale [1987]. The
reason is that, under the interim value/wealth maximization criterion used to choose liquidation
L t+1  from  I t , subject to  0 £ L t+1 £ I t ,  L t+1 Î (0 , I t)  will be chosen by individuals if and
only if  pt+ =1 1. With the ex post corner preferences assumed, this will be the case if and only
if { }C C Rt t, ,;1 21= = ,  as shown by Bhattacharya and Gale [1987].
Bencivenga and Smith [1991] and others have emphasized this difference between
Banking and Stock Market allocations, suggesting that it should apply even when the setting is
intergenerational in nature. However, as argued in Bhattacharya and Gale [1987] and
Bhattacharya and Padilla [1996], with intragenerational stock markets investment decisions
would be made by firms, or mutual funds, which consist of coalitions of agents of strictly
positive measure (to pool their liquidity risks). Such a coalition, if it plans to invest I and
liquidate L £ I next period, will issue a dividend stream {L ; R(I-L)} at the two consecutive
points, and early diers would sell their ex-first-dividend shares to late diers of the same fund.
However, the appropriate choice criterion for such mutual funds, if interim trading of ex-
dividend shares is re tricted to the members of a fund, would be to maximize the ex ante
expected utility V of their members, and not the interim market value of the {I,L} tuple. Hence
L = L  would be chosen, leading toC C C C1 1 2 2= =, , and expected utility V V
B = . As this
is the same allocation which occurs under intragenerational (Diamond-Dybvig) banking, we
will disregard Intragenerational Stock Markets in the analysis to follow.
We now proceed to consider alternative institutions in an intergenerational setting.
II.B Intergenerational Stock Markets (SM)
We consider a situation in which the generation born at time t invests 0 £ I t £ 1 in new
real investments, creating I t new firms, and (1 - I t) is invested by the new born in the shares of
existing firms. The price of ongoing (one period old) firms per unit of real investment at any
point of time t is given by pt  , with the price of completed technologies being R. These prices
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must satisfy the perfect foresight No Arbitrage Conditions, where qt is the unit price of new
investments at time t:
p
q p
t
t t
+1  = 
R
, (6.a)
p
q
p
q q
t
t
t
t t
+ +
+
1 2
1
 = 
R
. (6.b)
The right-hand-side of equations (6.b) represents the gross rate of returns from the two-period
invest and hold strategy, while the left-hand-side of (6.b) represents the rate of return from
holding a share of a new firm for one period, selling it, and then reinvesting in a share of a new
firm at (t+1). In contrast, the criterion in equation (6.a) results from equating the
contemporaneous rates of return on holding the shares of new firms, with that on holding (one-
period) old firms.
If agents can short-sell existing firms' shares to obtain additional resources (beyond their
endowments) for new real investment, or they can sequentially create, sell, and then create new
investments, value-maximizing investment equilibrium requires that for I t Î(0,1] to be optimal:
qt  = 1 ,    " t (6.c)
Also, substituting back from (6.c) into (6.b), we see that both (6.a) and (6.b) imply that, if the
chosen investment levels are interior and finite, then for all t   1 the following intertemporal
equilibrium condition must hold:
p pt t+1 = R, " t   1 (6.d)
Let  {I t }Î (0,1] ,  t  =  0, 1 ,2, ...,¥ ,   with  {L t}  =  0 ,  be the levels of new real investments
in the economy above, in an intergenerational stock market equilibrium (so that  qt = 1," t).
Denote   q qt t t tand, ,-1 ,  for t ³ 1 ,  as the per capita proportions of one period old capital
stock,  I t -1   , held at time t  by a representative agent of generation t and a late dier of
generation (t-1), respectively. Then, agents' budget constraints at different points of their lives,
and stock market clearing, together imply that:
t , -1I + I  = 1 , t  ,q t t t tp " ³ 1 (7.a)
q et t t t t tp p, -1 -1I  = I , t ,= 1 (7.b)
q e q et t t t t t t t tp R p, -1 , - -1I ( ) I = I , t ,+ - " ³- -1 21 1 2  (7.c)
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q e qt t t t, ,( )+ - = " ³-1 1 11   ,   t    , (7.d)
with : I0 1= and      q0 0 0, =  . (7.e)
Equation (7.a) results from the fact that the newborn will invest all their endowment in either
new real investments, or in buying the shares of one-period old firms, from “early dier” agents
of the previous generation. Equation (7.b) states that the t=1 sales of early diers of the 0-th
generation must be wholly absorbed by purchases by the members from the 1-st generation.
Equation (7.c) states that at all time points t ³ 2, the dividends which survivors (late diers)
from generation t-1 obtain from maturing technologies are used to purchase the difference
between sales by early diers of the same generation minus purchases of one period old
technologies by the new born. Finally, equation (7.d) represents the fact that total
shareholdings of one-period-old investments must add up to unity.
These stock market equilibrium conditions also have implications for the consumption
allocations of early and late diers. For early diers, it is straightforward to see, by updating (7.a),
that:
Ct t t, t ,t t-1  p I +R I1 1= + q   ,  " t   0.  (7.f)
For late diers, multiply (7.d) by  p It t-1  and substitute in (7.c) to obtain, after dividing by (1-
e):
q qt-1, t t t 1 t t 1p I p I- - - - -= + t t tRI1 1 2, (7.g)
In other words, their per capita portfolio value, after rebalancing at time  t  (L.H.S.), equals the
value of their old real investment made at (t-1), plus the dividends currently received on
maturing financial investments (in ongoing technology), which they had made at time (t-1).
Updating the R.H.S. of  (7.g)  we obtain:
C t t t, , t= R I2 1q +   ,   " t   0 (7.h)
In an Intergenerational Stock Market Equilibrium (SM), with perfect foresight, agents
of generation  t  therefore maximize to solve:
{ } [ ]V Max U C U C
SM
I
t t
t t t t t
º + -
-, ,
, ,
, ,
( ) ( ) ( )
q q
e e
1
1 21 (8)
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subject to the constraints embodied in equations (7.a, f, g, h).  Furthermore, prices and
quantities satisfy the no-arbitrage (with perfect foresight) and market-clearing conditions of
equations (6.d), (7.b, c, d, e). We show the existence of such equilibria constructively below.
Lemma 1. The characteristic dynamic equilibrium equation of SM, relating interim-age
(secondary market) real investment prices and levels over time, can be written as:
( ) [ ( )]1 1- = - -+I p It 1 t+1 te   ,  " ³t t (9)
where (t + 1)  is the time of the first unconstrained transaction on the intergenerational
stock-market (SM).
Proof.
To characterize the set of intergenerational stock market equilibria, it is useful to first simplify
equation (7.g), by dividing both sides by pt+1 . Then using (6.d) and (7.a) successively, obtain:
q qt,t+1 t t,tI = + = + - =-I p I I It t t t t1 1 1( )   ,  "  t   1 (9.a)
Next, letting  t º -(t 1) in equation (7.d) only, we obtain on multiplying by I t that:
[ ]q e qt t t t t t t+1, +1 , +1I = - =( )1 I I   ,  " ³t 1
which, on using (9.a) implies:
1 1 1- = - + +I It t t te q ,   ,  " ³ t 1 (9.b)
Finally, using (7.a) again in (9.b)  to substitute for  qt t+ +1 1,  ,  we get our desired result that:
pt t t t t t te q+ + + + +- = -1 1 1 1 11( ) ,I p p I  = - -+ +e t tp I1 11( )
from (7.a), or:
( ) [ ( )]1 11- = - -+I p I+1t t te   ,  "t ³ 1 (9.c)
which is equivalent to (9).  Notice though that since I 0 = 1 and (from 7.a  and 7.b)
I1 01= - e p I1 , if the early diers of generation 0 can sell all their shares to the next young, then in
that eventuality, equation (9.c) is also satisfied for  t = 0. QED.
As we show in Proposition 3 below,  the characteristic equation (9), reflecting perfect
foresight, absence of intemporal arbitrage, and market clearing, has only two consistent
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solutions.  The first, due to Fulghieri and  Rovelli [1993], and Dutta and Kapur [1994],
satisfies: p Rt k k+ = " ³, 0. But, as we shall see in the next section, it also requires
rationing of the very first generation to sell in such a market at t. The second solution is a two-
periodic one, with  p fort k k+ = ³1 1,  and  odd,  and  p Rt k k+ = " ³, 2 and
even,   where  t  is the first generation to trade in such a market. To simplify notation (only) in
the following ‘steady-state’ result, we assume t = 0, although that is inconsistent with the 0-th
generation having no prior investments to buy in the secondary market.
Proposition 3. The set of stationary or periodic intergenerational steady state stock market
equilibria, satisfying equations (7a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) and (8), are isolated, being one of the two
following, assuming the anticipation of stock market trading commencing at some t=0:
(a) { } = R ,  t = 1, 2,... , ,pt " ¥  (6.e)
implying: {I } = I ,  t = , 2,..., ,t SM " ¥1
which,  from equation (9) satisfies:  1- I  = R [ - (1- I )],SM SMe  
that is: SMI  = 1-
1+ R
,
e R
(10)
or:
(b) { } = 1  pt  for  t = 1, 3, 5, ..., odd  ;   and       (6.f)
{ } = R pt   for  t =  2, 4, 6, ..., even       (6.g)
with:It  = 1  for  t ³ 0  even,  and (11.a)
It  = 1 - e for  t  1³    odd, (11.b)
which clearly satisfies equation (9).
The consumption allocations at the two alternative stock market allocations are given, using
equations (8.a,b), by:
(a) C R C R tt t, ,; ,1 2 0= = " ³ , (12)
and:
(b) C C R tt t, ,; ,1 21 0= = " ³   and  even ;
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C R C R tt t, ,; ,1 2 0= = " ³  and  odd. (13)
Proof. For Part (a), see Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993] or Dutta and Kapur [1994].
For Part (b), it suffices to note that eqs. (6.f, g) ,  (11.a, b) and  (13)  satisfy (9).
Remarks.   (i) If stock market equilibrium commences at time t = 0, with I t - 1 = 0,
then given (7.a) the only intergenerational stock market equilibrium consistent with the initial
condition is the periodic stock market equilibrium (b).
(ii) Also note that, since iterating equation (6.d) implies that p p tt t= " ³+2 1, , no
other periodic stock market equilibrium with periodicity k > 2 exists.
We now move on to consider the dynamics of transition to the steady-state
intergenerational allocation and risk-sharing mechanisms described above.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Models of intertemporal liquidity risks, or "preference shocks" - developed in Bryant [1980]
and further examined in the works of Diamond and Dybvig [1983], Bhattacharya and Gale [1987],
and Jacklin [1987] among others - have recently been extended to the realm of ongoing dynamic
overlapping generations (OLG) economies; see Bencivenga and Smith [1991], Qi [1994], Fulghieri
and Rovelli [1993] and Dutta and Kapur [1994]. These models may be used to evaluate the
essential tradeoffs which arise in two distinct areas of current debate. The first is on the evaluation
of alternative (or possibly complementary) arrangements for the monetary system, for example the
relative merits of a market-value-based vs. an intermediated banking system. The second
interpretation, clearly requiring a considerably longer definition of the time unit, pertains to the
debate on the viability and desirability of differing social security (pension) systems,  and in
particular the choice between Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) versus Funded or Capital-reserve  systems
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(e.g. Boldrin and Rustichini, 1995). Our paper considers the latter set of tradeoffs in an OLG model
outside of long-run steady states.
In our paper, agents choose among intertemporal liquidity-sharing or insurance
mechanisms, in an OLG economy in which the capital stock is possibly longer-lived than agents’
lives.  We focus on the comparisons between “Banking” or PAYG systems, of both an intra- and
inter-generational nature, versus Stock Market based in er-generational financial systems. The
essential tradeoffs across these institutional mechanisms arise from the need for financial contracting
to provide agents with liquidity insurance, related to the uncertainty regarding their preferences for
their intertemporal allocation of consumption1. Such preference shocks, coupled with real
investment opportunities that are long-lived and technologically illiquid, create a demand for interim
stock markets, or financial intermediaries and contracts such as deposits withdrawable (fully or
partially) on demand.
In dynamic OLG economies, there is in addition the possibility of designing contracts (or
mechanisms) for sharing such liquidity risk across generations, taking advantage of the "life cycle"
structure to the demand for savings of each generation. With the long horizons envisioned, one may
think of events such as uncertain workers’ disability as a source of early withdrawal demand. In
recent papers, by Qi [1994], Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993], and Dutta and Kapur [1994], alternative
institutional arrangements for such intertemporal consumption-smoothing and liquidity risk-sharing
mechanisms, within and across generations, have been examined and compared.
Under some assumptions, in particular the restriction of the analysis to steady states only,
both Qi [1994] and Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993] show that there exist intergenerational financial
intermediation contracts that can attain the Golden Rule (Phelps, 1961) levels of investment and
consumption-smoothing. The paper of Fulghieri and Rovelli, and the later work of Bhattacharya
and Padilla [1996], also focus on the comparison of intergenerational Banks versus Stock Markets
for investments that are long-lived in nature. In contrast to the earlier models, which focus either on
a static economy (Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987) or on intra-generational mechanisms only
(Bencivenga and Smith, 1991), Fulghieri and Rovelli find that stock markets result (in steady state)
in underinvestment in he long-lived technology, relative to the Golden Rule optimum, without any
investment in short-term liquid technologies or early liquidation2. This occurs essentially owing to
the incompleteness of contracts for resource transfers across generations, which in a stock market
economy can take place only through real investments in long-lived technologies and bilateral
trading at their interim market valuations.
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In all of the above mentioned papers, the analysis of the functioning of intermediaries and
stock markets is confined to steady states, in which the inheritance of a stationary level of
investment by prior generations is taken as given. However, given the endowment structure in these
models, this is a restrictive assumption, especially vi  à vis the first generation which only has its
initial endowment to start a resource-transfer cum liquidity-insurance scheme. While Qi [1994]
briefly examines this issue (see his Propositions 5 and 6), his analysis is focused on PAYG systems
only, rather than on the choices among alternative risk sharing mechanisms.
More specifically, the following questions remain unanswered: given initial conditions, is it
possible to predict which allocational mechanisms would be chosen by the generations present, and
would the same choice be repeated by the subsequent generations, i.e., be intergenerationally stable
or Self-Sustaining? For example, consider the three institutional mechanisms which we shall analyze
below: (i) Intragenerational Bank (B), (ii) Intergenerational Banking (IB) and (iii) Intergenerational
Stock Market (SM). Suppose these may be ranked in a particular way by the steady state welfare
criterion. Then, is it necessarily true that, when the issues related to (a) transition to the steady state,
and (b) non-cooperative intergenerational choices are taken into account, the most efficient steady
state allocational mechanism would indeed be chosen and be intergenerationally self-sustaining?  We
seek to address these questions in this paper.
In defining our notions of inter-generational choices over mechanisms for financing of
investment and consumption smoothing, we shall not be employing notions such as the Core, whose
applicability to the OLG setting is dubious at best. As Esteban [1986] and Esteban and Millan
[1990] have shown, even when the Golden Rule allocation does impr ve the welfare of the first
generation (the Samuelson, 1958, case of Gale, 1973), it is not in the intergenerational Core (never
for a single commodity setting)3. Fortunately, as Esteban and Sakovics [1993] have emphasized,
negative results like those mentioned above do not imply that intergenerational transfer mechanisms
become infeasible. Society may cope with such a conundrum, created by the "not in the Core"
result, by restricting the language or strategy space of intergenerational proposals for choosing its
Institutional Mechanisms for intergenerational reallocations. In the context of the Esteban and
Sakovics model, of a pure-exchange OLG environment with agents' endowments tilted to the early
period(s) of life, they argue that in a time-stationary model the appropriate notion of an Institutional
proposal is that of a time-stationary transfer scheme, from each current and future generation when
young to its preceding generation when old. Institutions survive if and only if they constitute
Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) (Selten, 1975) in such an intergenerational proposal game. A
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similar restriction is employed by Boldrin and Rustichini [1995], in their modelling of inter-
generational social security schemes versus intra-generational accumulation of short-lived
investments.
In our model below, we define the concept of a Self-Sustaining investment and consumption
allocation Mechanism, using restrictions motivated by analogous considerations. The spirit of these
is that proposals that make later generations strictly worse off than the proposing one are not
allowed. Such a restriction may arise spontaneously for market-based mechanisms, or be a result of
societal Norms embodied in a legislated Pay As You Go (PAYG) mechanism such as IB. In
particular, we restrict the set of proposals by each generation to be one of the three Institutions that
were indicated above: Transition to Steady-State of Intergenerational Banking (TIB),
Intergenerational Stock Market (SM), and Intragenerational Banking (B) (The first of these takes
into account the lack of inherited prior capital investments for the first generation). Some  of these
proposals may require that an older and a younger generation agree on the "sharing" of the inherited
capital stock plus the endowment of the young. Hence, each stage game in our model is one of
Proposals and Counter-Proposals by  the two overlapping generations, unlike in Esteban and
Sakovics [1993] where only young propose transfers to the currently old.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we set out the basic model and delineate
the Golden Rule and other steady state allocations under the three alternative institutional
arrangements of B, IB, and SM. The dynamics of transition to these steady states, and the ranking
of welfare levels attainable under each alternative institutional mechanism ( TIB, SM, B), taking
transition into account, are the foci of Section III. Intergenerational Proposal Games over these
(transition) Institutions and their subgame perfect equilibria, which we term intergenerationally Self-
Sustaining Mechanisms, are described and characterized in Section IV. In Section V we conclude
with a discussion of our results in the context of recent literature and with suggestions for further
research.
The major results that emerge from the analysis in the paper are the following. First, we
point out that there exists a feasible stationary consumption path (TIB) such that capital
accumulation along that path will lead, within a finite horizon, to the Golden Rule steady state
optimal allocation. Furthermore the consumption levels attained along this path ensure that the
welfare of each generation involved in the transition s ictly exceeds that attainable from any
intragenerational mechanism4. Second, we show that there exists a faster one-shot transition to the
steady  state intergenerational stock market (SM) allocation (Fulghieri and Rovelli, 1993)5. Third
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we prove that a transition to SM that benefits the proposing current young, which exists unless they
are extremely risk averse, must involve strictly rationing the participation of the concurrent
preceding generation in the initial market (only). Fourth,  we prove that under reasonable parameter
values, there exists an intergenerational conflict in any stage game. Specifically, at any time, the
currently young may stand to gain by proposing a (rationed and immediate) transition to the
stationary intergenerational stock market allocation (SM), whereas the currently  middle-aged are
made strictly worse off, relative to the "slowest turnpike" allocation (TIB), from accepting such a
proposal. Finally, in the last step we delineate how this conflict may be resolved, in the sequence of
equilibria of the intergenerational proposal games across overlapping generations.
The equilibrium outcome of the intergenerational proposal games depends crucially on the
relative expected utility  payoff(s) of the middle-aged generation(s) from their rationed transition to
the stock market (SM), versus their fallback option of doing intragenerational liquidity risk-sharing
(B), based on their inherited endowment net of prior payout obligations. It turns out that the
currently middle-aged generation(s) are better off from their fallback option (B), relative to the
constrained (for them only) transition to SM proposed by their “children”, if and only if (i) the
proportion of the generation requiring early liquidity (withdrawal) is small, and (ii) agents in the
generation are ex ante highly risk-averse (or averse to unsmoothed consumption profiles). If either
of these conditions on agents’ ex ante characteristics is not satisfied then, and only then, the stock
market (SM) institutional arrangement (which is always suboptimal relative to IB in the steady
state) becomes the unique subgame - and “trembling-hand” perfect (Selten, 1975) equilibrium of the
intergenerational proposal games6.
II. THE MODEL AND STATIONARY ALLOCATIONS
II.A Optimal Allocations and Intermediated Outcomes
We consider an extended version of the overlapping generation (OLG) model of
Samuelson [1958], that was first advanced by Bryant [1980].  Time is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2,
..., ¥.  Each generation consists of a continuum of agents of unit measure. An agent born at
time point t ³ 0 is alive at time point (t+1), and possibly also at time point (t+2). Each
generation is endowed with one unit of the single commodity, spread equally across its
members, at birth; this may be thought of as labor income or prior savings. To simplify matters,
we assume that an agent born at t only wishes to consume from his savings at time-point (t+1)
if he is an early dier, or at time-point (t+2) if she is a late dier. Such simple ex post corner
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preferences, introduced by Diamond and Dybvig [1983], imply that the allocations produced
by intragenerational stock markets and banking systems coincide, provided market
participation is suitably restricted; see Jacklin [1987], and Bhattacharya and Gale [1987].
Agents become early or late diers with probabilities e nd (1-e) respectively. These
events are independent across the continuum of agents in each generation, so that a proportion
(1-e) of agents born at time  t  is alive at time  (t+2), when they die. Thus, the ex ante
expected utility of a representative agent of generation t is given by:
t , ,V  = U( ) + (1- )U( )e eC Ct t1 2 (1)
where { }C Ct t, ,,1 2 are the (certain) allocations of consumption to early and late diers of
generation t, respectively. The utility function  U(.)  is assumed to be strictly increasing and
concave, with U’(0) = ¥.
There are two investment technologies in the model. The first is long-lived with constant
returns to scale: investment of I t at time t returns RI t,  > 1 , at time (t+2). The second
technology is that of storage, without any loss or depreciation, between time points t to (t+1).
The long-lived investment  I t  can also be liquidated at time (t+1) to yield Q L t+1 , where 0 £ Q
£ 1,  and 0 £ L t+1 £ I t  ;  we assume Q = 1 , so that early liquidation and storage technologies
are  equivalent7.
The Golden Rule (Phelps, 1961) stationary optimal intergenerational investment and
consumption plan thus solves the problem:
{ } [ ]
*
, , ,
, ,V  ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
º + -Max C C
I L C C
t t
t t t t1 2
1 21e e U  U (2)
s.t.: e e C  Ct t t t t tR I L L I t- - - -+ - £ + - + - "1 1 2 2 2 11 1, ,( ) ( ) , , (2.a)
0  L   It t£ £ £+1 1 (2.b)
As shown, for example, in Fulghieri and Rovelli (1993, Proposition 1), the solution to this
problem is characterised by full investment of the initial endowment of each new generation, no
liquidation of invested capital, and a level of consumption for early and late diers which is
constant and equal to R. Furthermore, Qi [1994], Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993], and Dutta and
Kapur [1994] give the conditions under which the Golden Rule allocation may be implemented
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by an intergenerational banking system. These results are summarised in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. (a) (Fulghieri and Rovelli 1993).The Golden Rule (Stationary) Optimal
Intergenerational Allocation Rule, which maximizes (2) subject to (2.a) and (2.b), is given by:
t
*
t
*
,1
*
,
*I  = 1 , L  = 0 , C = C = R , t .t t 2 "
(b) (Qi 1994, Fulghieri and Rovelli 1993, and Dutta and Kapoor 1994). If agents/depositors
can be subject to a No Redepositing Condition within (and across) banks, then a single
welfare-maximizing bank (or equivalently, many representative competing banks) would, in
equilibrium, offer each generation the deposit contract: It   i  deposits leads to withdrawal
rights RIt  at time (t+1) or time (t+2), at the choice of the depositor. Furthermore, all agents
born at t would deposit all their initial endowment in banks, which would invest it (It =1) in
long-lived investments only, without early liquidation. Thus intergenerational banking (IB)
would implement the Golden Rule optimum. Hence in particular:
C C Rt i
IB
t i, ,
*= =  ,     { }i Î "    t12, ,
(c) If redepositing after early withdrawal by agents is not monitorable (indistinguishable from
an initial deposit), especially if done across banks, but depositing at one bank by another can
be prohibited, then ex ante Bertrand competition among banks would lead to the outcome:
depositing I t=1 by each depositor of each generation t confers her with withdrawal rights
CU1 at time (t+1) or C
U
2  at time (t+2), where these satisfy (suppressing the t-subscript):
C CU U1 2 < R < , (4.a)
( )2   C CU U1 2£ (4.b)
e e C  C1 2
U U+  (1- ) =R (4.c)
Proof. See either Qi, Fulghieri and Rovelli, or Dutta and Kapur.
Remark. The Golden Rule optimum  is,  of course,  strictly  valid  as a solution concept only
when t Î{-¥, ...,-1 , 0 , 1, ..., ¥} since, for example, if  t Î { 0, 1, ..., ¥},  and  I 1 = 1 and L 1 =
0, then the early diers of generation 0 will obtain consumptionC0 1 0, = . These issues raise
questions about the transition to these stationary optimal allocations, which we discuss in the
next section. The notion of a competitive banking system is also not unambiguous in an OLG
xxiii
setting, and one may think instead of the resulting allocations as arising from a legislated
allocation mechanism.
In contrast,  the constrained optimal intragenerational allocation, solves the problem:
[ ]V    U(C )  + (1- )U(C )
, , ,
1 2º
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
Max
I L C C1 2
e e (3)
s.t.: 0  C   L,1£ £e (3.a)
0  (1- )C   R(I-L),2£ £e (3.b)
0  I  1.£ £ (3.c)
The solution to this problem is characterized by Diamond and Dybvig [1993], who also show
that this allocation may be implemented with a single welfare-maximizing bank or several
(representative) competing banks who are Bertrand Competitors and obtain clienteles of
strictly positive measure. The latter result assumes no interim trading of assets across
competing banks at the interim period; see Bhattacharya and Gale [1987].
Proposition 2. (Diamond and Dybvig 1993). The Optimal Intragenerational Allocation Rule,
which maximizes in (3) subject to (3.a) to (3.c), is given by:
I  = 1,  ¢ ¢U (C )  = RU (C ),1 2   C L C R L
_
/ ; 
_
 (
_
) / ( )1 2 1 1= = - -e e
Furthermore, in a competitive intragenerational banking system equilibrium, deposit
contracts of the form { deposit I at time t implies withdrawal rights C C IB1 1=  or C C I
B
2 2= ,
at times (t + 1) or (t + 2) respectively} would prevail, leading to expected utility V VB = ,
and each depositor would deposit I = 1 at one (or many) bank(s), and each bank would invest
its deposits in short-term (early liquidation) and long-term investments in the proportions L
and 1 -L  , respectively.
Proof. See Diamond and Dybvig [1983]8.
The following implications of Proposition 2 are straightforward.
Corollary 1. For all e > 0 , the expected utility VB of an agent in the optimal
intragenerational allocation is strictly less than its level V* at the Golden Rule
intergenerational optimum.
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Proof. Since  C C
_
,
_
1 2 0
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
>   and hence L Î (0,1), given U'(0) = ¥, we have
( )1 < = L +R(1-L)  < R,e e C C1 21+ -
whereas C C R1 2
* *= = , from which the conclusion follows using Jensen's inequality.     QED.
Corollary 2. (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983)  If  U(Ci ), i Î {1,2}, has its Relative Risk Aversion
Coefficient uniformly strictly greater than unity (that for logarithmic utility), then
1 <   R,   C C1 2< <
implying: e  < L  < 1.
We should briefly mention the al ernatives to the existence of bank-type intermediaries
(and "unconditional" withdrawal rights) in this setting. The extreme one is that of intra- and
inter-generational Autarky, under which each agent would invest I=1 when young, and
consume  CA1 1=  if she is an early dier, and C R
A
2 =  if she is a late dier, with expected utility:
A
1
A
2
AV   U(C )  + (1- )U(C )º e e  , (5)
 where it is obvious that:  A *V   V  < V ,£  with the first inequality also strict unless U(C) =
log(C),  since { L = e, C1 = 1, C2 = R} is always feasible under intragenerational banking.
A less extreme comparison is  with an institution often analyzed in "standard" financial
modelling: the Intragenerational Stock Market. If individuals still invest on their own, but can
sell their long-term investments I t at a linear price  p It t+1  at time (t+1), then it turns out that
the interim value-maximizing consumption-investment outcome will be the same under
intragenerational stock markets as under Autarky; see Bhattacharya and Gale [1987]. The
reason is that, under the interim value/wealth maximization criterion used to choose liquidation
L t+1  from  I t , subject to  0 £ L t+1 £ I t ,  L t+1 Î (0 , I t)  will be chosen by individuals if and
only if  pt+ =1 1. With the ex post corner preferences assumed, this will be the case if and only
if { }C C Rt t, ,;1 21= = ,  as shown by Bhattacharya and Gale [1987].
Bencivenga and Smith [1991] and others have emphasized this difference between
Banking and Stock Market allocations, suggesting that it should apply even when the setting is
intergenerational in nature. However, as argued in Bhattacharya and Gale [1987] and
Bhattacharya and Padilla [1996], with intragenerational stock markets investment decisions
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would be made by firms, or mutual funds, which consist of coalitions of agents of strictly
positive measure (to pool their liquidity risks). Such a coalition, if it plans to invest I and
liquidate L £ I next period, will issue a dividend stream {L ; R(I-L)} at the two consecutive
points, and early diers would sell their ex-first-dividend shares to late diers of the same fund.
However, the appropriate choice criterion for such mutual funds, if interim trading of ex-
dividend shares is re tricted to the members of a fund, would be to maximize the ex ante
expected utility V of their members, and not the interim market value of the {I,L} tuple. Hence
L = L  would be chosen, leading toC C C C1 1 2 2= =, , and expected utility V V
B = . As this
is the same allocation which occurs under intragenerational (Diamond-Dybvig) banking, we
will disregard Intragenerational Stock Markets in the analysis to follow.
We now proceed to consider alternative institutions in an intergenerational setting.
II.B Intergenerational Stock Markets (SM)
We consider a situation in which the generation born at time t invests 0 £ I t £ 1 in new
real investments, creating I t new firms, and (1 - I t) is invested by the new born in the shares of
existing firms. The price of ongoing (one period old) firms per unit of real investment at any
point of time t is given by pt  , with the price of completed technologies being R. These prices
must satisfy the perfect foresight No Arbitrage Conditions, where qt is the unit price of new
investments at time t:
p
q p
t
t t
+1  = 
R
, (6.a)
p
q
p
q q
t
t
t
t t
+ +
+
1 2
1
 = 
R
. (6.b)
The right-hand-side of equations (6.b) represents the gross rate of returns from the two-period
invest and hold strategy, while the left-hand-side of (6.b) represents the rate of return from
holding a share of a new firm for one period, selling it, and then reinvesting in a share of a new
firm at (t+1). In contrast, the criterion in equation (6.a) results from equating the
contemporaneous rates of return on holding the shares of new firms, with that on holding (one-
period) old firms.
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If agents can short-sell existing firms' shares to obtain additional resources (beyond their
endowments) for new real investment, or they can sequentially create, sell, and then create new
investments, value-maximizing investment equilibrium requires that for I t Î(0,1] to be optimal:
qt  = 1 ,    " t (6.c)
Also, substituting back from (6.c) into (6.b), we see that both (6.a) and (6.b) imply that, if the
chosen investment levels are interior and finite, then for all t   1 the following intertemporal
equilibrium condition must hold:
p pt t+1 = R, " t   1 (6.d)
Let  {I t }Î (0,1] ,  t  =  0, 1 ,2, ...,¥ ,   with  {L t}  =  0 ,  be the levels of new real investments
in the economy above, in an intergenerational stock market equilibrium (so that  qt = 1," t).
Denote   q qt t t tand, ,-1 ,  for t ³ 1 ,  as the per capita proportions of one period old capital
stock,  I t -1   , held at time t  by a representative agent of generation t and a late dier of
generation (t-1), respectively. Then, agents' budget constraints at different points of their lives,
and stock market clearing, together imply that:
t , -1I + I  = 1 , t  ,q t t t tp " ³ 1 (7.a)
q et t t t t tp p, -1 -1I  = I , t ,= 1 (7.b)
q e q et t t t t t t t tp R p, -1 , - -1I ( ) I = I , t ,+ - " ³- -1 21 1 2  (7.c)
q e qt t t t, ,( )+ - = " ³-1 1 11   ,   t    , (7.d)
with : I0 1= and      q0 0 0, =  . (7.e)
Equation (7.a) results from the fact that the newborn will invest all their endowment in either
new real investments, or in buying the shares of one-period old firms, from “early dier” agents
of the previous generation. Equation (7.b) states that the t=1 sales of early diers of the 0-th
generation must be wholly absorbed by purchases by the members from the 1-st generation.
Equation (7.c) states that at all time points t ³ 2, the dividends which survivors (late diers)
from generation t-1 obtain from maturing technologies are used to purchase the difference
between sales by early diers of the same generation minus purchases of one period old
technologies by the new born. Finally, equation (7.d) represents the fact that total
shareholdings of one-period-old investments must add up to unity.
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These stock market equilibrium conditions also have implications for the consumption
allocations of early and late diers. For early diers, it is straightforward to see, by updating (7.a),
that:
Ct t t, t ,t t-1  p I +R I1 1= + q   ,  " t   0.  (7.f)
For late diers, multiply (7.d) by  p It t-1  and substitute in (7.c) to obtain, after dividing by (1-
e):
q qt-1, t t t 1 t t 1p I p I- - - - -= + t t tRI1 1 2, (7.g)
In other words, their per capita portfolio value, after rebalancing at time  t  (L.H.S.), equals the
value of their old real investment made at (t-1), plus the dividends currently received on
maturing financial investments (in ongoing technology), which they had made at time (t-1).
Updating the R.H.S. of  (7.g)  we obtain:
C t t t, , t= R I2 1q +   ,   " t   0 (7.h)
In an Intergenerational Stock Market Equilibrium (SM), with perfect foresight, agents
of generation  t  therefore maximize to solve:
{ } [ ]V Max U C U C
SM
I
t t
t t t t t
º + -
-, ,
, ,
, ,
( ) ( ) ( )
q q
e e
1
1 21 (8)
subject to the constraints embodied in equations (7.a, f, g, h).  Furthermore, prices and
quantities satisfy the no-arbitrage (with perfect foresight) and market-clearing conditions of
equations (6.d), (7.b, c, d, e). We show the existence of such equilibria constructively below.
Lemma 1. The characteristic dynamic equilibrium equation of SM, relating interim-age
(secondary market) real investment prices and levels over time, can be written as:
( ) [ ( )]1 1- = - -+I p It 1 t+1 te   ,  " ³t t (9)
where (t + 1)  is the time of the first unconstrained transaction on the intergenerational
stock-market (SM).
Proof.
To characterize the set of intergenerational stock market equilibria, it is useful to first simplify
equation (7.g), by dividing both sides by pt+1 . Then using (6.d) and (7.a) successively, obtain:
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q qt,t+1 t t,tI = + = + - =-I p I I It t t t t1 1 1( )   ,  "  t   1 (9.a)
Next, letting  t º -(t 1) in equation (7.d) only, we obtain on multiplying by I t that:
[ ]q e qt t t t t t t+1, +1 , +1I = - =( )1 I I   ,  " ³t 1
which, on using (9.a) implies:
1 1 1- = - + +I It t t te q ,   ,  " ³ t 1 (9.b)
Finally, using (7.a) again in (9.b)  to substitute for  qt t+ +1 1,  ,  we get our desired result that:
pt t t t t t te q+ + + + +- = -1 1 1 1 11( ) ,I p p I  = - -+ +e t tp I1 11( )
from (7.a), or:
( ) [ ( )]1 11- = - -+I p I+1t t te   ,  "t ³ 1 (9.c)
which is equivalent to (9).  Notice though that since I 0 = 1 and (from 7.a  and 7.b)
I1 01= - e p I1 , if the early diers of generation 0 can sell all their shares to the next young, then in
that eventuality, equation (9.c) is also satisfied for  t = 0. QED.
As we show in Proposition 3 below,  the characteristic equation (9), reflecting perfect
foresight, absence of intemporal arbitrage, and market clearing, has only two consistent
solutions.  The first, due to Fulghieri and  Rovelli [1993], and Dutta and Kapur [1994],
satisfies: p Rt k k+ = " ³, 0. But, as we shall see in the next section, it also requires
rationing of the very first generation to sell in such a market at t. The second solution is a two-
periodic one, with  p fort k k+ = ³1 1,  and  odd,  and  p Rt k k+ = " ³, 2 and
even,   where  t  is the first generation to trade in such a market. To simplify notation (only) in
the following ‘steady-state’ result, we assume t = 0, although that is inconsistent with the 0-th
generation having no prior investments to buy in the secondary market.
Proposition 3. The set of stationary or periodic intergenerational steady state stock market
equilibria, satisfying equations (7a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) and (8), are isolated, being one of the two
following, assuming the anticipation of stock market trading commencing at some t=0:
(a) { } = R ,  t = 1, 2,... , ,pt " ¥  (6.e)
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implying: {I } = I ,  t = , 2,..., ,t SM " ¥1
which,  from equation (9) satisfies:  1- I  = R [ - (1- I )],SM SMe  
that is: SMI  = 1-
1+ R
,
e R
(10)
or:
(b) { } = 1  pt  for  t = 1, 3, 5, ..., odd  ;   and       (6.f)
{ } = R pt   for  t =  2, 4, 6, ..., even       (6.g)
with:It  = 1  for  t ³ 0  even,  and (11.a)
It  = 1 - e for  t  1³    odd, (11.b)
which clearly satisfies equation (9).
The consumption allocations at the two alternative stock market allocations are given, using
equations (8.a,b), by:
(a) C R C R tt t, ,; ,1 2 0= = " ³ , (12)
and:
(b) C C R tt t, ,; ,1 21 0= = " ³   and  even ;
C R C R tt t, ,; ,1 2 0= = " ³  and  odd. (13)
Proof. For Part (a), see Fulghieri and Rovelli [1993] or Dutta and Kapur [1994].
For Part (b), it suffices to note that eqs. (6.f, g) ,  (11.a, b) and  (13)  satisfy (9).
Remarks.   (i) If stock market equilibrium commences at time t = 0, with I t - 1 = 0,
then given (7.a) the only intergenerational stock market equilibrium consistent with the initial
condition is the periodic stock market equilibrium (b).
(ii) Also note that, since iterating equation (6.d) implies that p p tt t= " ³+2 1, , no
other periodic stock market equilibrium with periodicity k > 2 exists.
We now move on to consider the dynamics of transition to the steady-state
intergenerational allocation and risk-sharing mechanisms described above.
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IV. INTERGENERATIONAL PROPOSAL GAMES AND EQUILIBRIA
IV.A Self-Sustaining Mechanisms
We now move on to define and analyze a class of non cooperative intergenerational
proposal games, across the sequence of overlapping generations in our model. Each  stage
game of the proposal game, at times t = 1, 2, ..., ¥ is modeled as a proposal cum counter-
proposal game between the two generations, born at (t-1), the middle-aged, and at  t,  the new
born,  which at time  t  are in a position to make (real or financial) investment decisions. This
represents an extension of the “transfer game” across generations analyzed by Esteban and
Sakovics (1993), in which the authors allow only the young at any time  t  to make proposals
for  changing the previously agreed upon transfers to the old of the immediately prior
generation. Our two-sided proposal / counter-proposal game is necessary, because two of the
allowed proposals involve either the access to the initial endowment of the new born by the
currently middle aged (TIB), or the utilization (acquisition at some price) of the inherited
intermediate-maturity capital stock of the middle-aged by the young (the non-periodic, quantity
constrained SM transition of part (b) of Proposition 5). Hence, because of this change relative
to Esteban and Sakovics, we must specify not only the payoffs to agents taking into account
subsequent s age games at times  t+1, t+2, ..., but also their payoffs in the events of both
agreement (regarding the allocational mechanism to be continued or switched to) as well as
disagreement among the overlapping generations at any time t. We do so below assuming
that:
(i) in the event of an agreement a  time t, this is binding until time (t+1) at least, and
(ii) in the event of disagreement on proposals at time  t:
· the currently middle-aged obtain their autarkic payoff given their endowment, and
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· the new born at time t can always revise both their proposal/program at time t and their
proposal (planned) at time  (t+1).
We restrict the pure strategy set of each overlapping generation in the stage games at
times t= 1, 2, ..., ¥ , to be the 3-tuple of allocation mechanisms (or Institutions, in the
terminology of Esteban and Sakovics) {B, TIB, SM }, that were characterized in Sections II
and III above. We do so for the following reasons. First, as we have suggested earlier, the  TIB
and SM  intergenerational allocation mechanisms have the feature that, if at time  t  a current
(agreed upon) mechanism is started and is continued through times  t ,  t+1 , t+2 , ..., etc., then
generations subsequent to the new born at time t are never worse off than the t-th generation.
We postulate that reasonable proposal processes (e.g., in a legislature) satisfy this “minimal
degree of fairness” property, even though the resulting mechanism need not guarantee, say,
ultimate attainment of the Golden Rule optimum in the long run. The spirit of this restriction is
identical to that underlying the transfer institutions or proposals described in Esteban and
Sakovics [1993] or Boldrin and Rustichini [1995]. Second, while we have not proved that the
three institutions / mechanisms which each generation is allowed  to propose are the nly nes
that are (i) intergenerationally st tionary for future generations on their continuation paths,
and (ii) viable, they do represent the set of major significant alternatives in many aggregate
(macroeconomic) settings, such as: generationally autarkic, pay as you go, and market-based
pension plan systems. Once we step outside the class of these three mechanisms, we essentially
open a Pandora’s Box of proposals that satisfy the second criterion (ii)  but not the first (i),
that we deem desirable to impose12.
The stage games, at each time-point of the infinite horizon intergenerational proposal
game, could themselves involve (at least) three alternative extensive forms:
A) The middle-aged moving first and proposing, and the young counter-proposing;  or
B) The new born moving first and proposing, and the middle-aged counter-proposing; or
C) Simultaneous proposals by the two generations overlapping at any point in time.
Of these alternatives, cases (B) and (C) are relatively more in accordance with the spirit of the
transfer-proposal game of Esteban and Sakovics (1993). Furthermore, the equilibrium outcome
in case (A) is also somewhat obvious, given that  V TIB > VB (Proposition 4) and V TIB >
VSM(MA) (Proposition 6) always. It turns out, on the other hand, that (i) the equilibrium
outcomes in cases (B) and (C), suitably defined, generically coi cide with each other, and (ii)
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they depend on the relative magnitude of VTIB versus VSM(NB), as well as on VSM(MA) versus
VB .  We now proceed to describe the agents’ strategies and payoffs more precisely, and also
to define the notion of Sel -Sustaining Mechanisms arising from these proposal games across
current and future generations.
TABLE 2.
Payoffs  in  (First Stage) Proposal Game
M IDDLE -AGED
NEW BORN
B TIB SM
  B { V B ,V B} {V(c), V B} {V(c),V B}
  TIB {V(c),V B} {V( ¢c ),VTIB } {V(c),V B}
  SM {V(c),V B} {V(c) , V B  } { VSM (NB), VSM (MA)}
In Table 2, we describe the pure strategy payoffs in the simultaneous moves case (C) of
the proposal stage scheme, across generations 0 and 1, postponing the discussion of
subsequent stage games until the subsequent result (Proposition 8). Notice that the
continuation payoff, V(c) or V(¢c ), of the new born in the event of disagreement takes into
account the optimal reswitching strategy of these agents. It is easy, using Table 2, to write the
payoffs in the extensive form game trees of the stage games in cases (A) and (B) above.
Mixtures of stage game pure strategies (uncorrelated) by players are allowed  in all the cases.
We define the continuation payoff for the new born, at any stage game at time t, as:
V(c) = [V TIB]  ,   if  {TIB, TIB} is in  [ SSM (t +1)½ Ht+1 = (1, 0) ] (22.a)
and :V(c) = [ VSM (MA)½ Ht+1 = (1, 0) ],   otherwise, (22.b)
where Ht+1 is the vector of real capital stock (one-period old and maturing) which the current
(as of time t) new born generation will be holding at time (t+1), and  SSM (.) represents the
notion  of Self-Sustaining Mechanisms, to be defined below.   The payoff   V(¢c )  is
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analogously defined, with  Ht+1 now equaling the inherited capital stock vector along the TIB
path, starting at  t = 0.
We conclude this subsection with the following definition of equilibrium outcomes in the
proposal game:
Definition.  A Self-Sustaining Mechanism (SSM) is a sequence of outcomes of the
intergenerational stage games at times t = 1, 2, ..., ¥ , such that the outcomes and
equilibrium strategies  (given Ht ) at each time t,  {SSM (t)}, satisfy the criteria that, "  t ³ 1:
(1)  SSM(t)  Î NE(t), Nash Equilibrium in stage  t ;
(2) { }SSM
t
( )t t=
¥
Î NE(t),  Subgame Perfect Equilibrium across stages (Selten, 1975);
(3) { }SSM t( )  Î SPE(t) in the stage game at time t ,in cases (A) and (B), or:
{ }SSM t( )  Î TPE(t), the Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (Selten, 1975) set
at t , in case (C) (simultaneous-move) of the stage game.
IV.B Equilibrium outcomes: Only the meek shall inherit the earth
We can now state and prove the result suggested in the previous section (Propositions 6
and 7). We do so assuming that V(c) = V(¢c . While this assumption on V(c) is critical for an
unique outcome in a subset of case (C), and it may appear to be unduly restrictive, in
Proposition 8 below we shall prove that, under reasonable conditions,  it is naturally satisfied13.
Theorem.Self-Sustaining Mechanisms in the first stage Intergenerational Proposal Games
are characterized as follows:
a. In case (A), middle-aged move first,    SSM(t) = { }TIB TIB, .
b. In case (B), new born move first, then either of the following equilibria may result:
b.1.  SSM(t) = { }TIB TIB,
if either: (b.1.1) VSM (NB) < VTIB  ;
or: (b.1.2) VSM (NB)  ³ VTIB and VSM (MA) < VB ;
b.2. SSM(t) = { }SM SM,
if: VSM (NB) > VTIB  and   VSM (MA) ³ VB ;
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b.3. Both { }SM SM, and { }TIB TIB, ( )Î SSM t
if: VSM (NB) = VTIB  and  VSM (MA) ³ VB .
c. In case (C),  the following equilibria may result:
c.1.  SSM(t) = { }TIB TIB,
if either:(c.1.1)  VSM (NB) < VTIB ;
or: (c.1.2) VSM (MA) < VB  .
c. 2 SSM(t) = { }SM SM,
if:    VSM (NB) > VTIB   and    VSM (MA) ³ VB .
c.3 Both  { }SM SM,  and  { }TIB TIB, Î SSM (t)
if: VSM (NB) =  VTIB   and   VSM (MA) ³ VB .
Proof.    Part (a) follows from Propositions (4) and (6).
In part (c.2), the fact that { }SM SM,  is uniquely in SSM(t) follows from using the Trembling
Hand Perfect equilibrium concept and from the maintained hypothesis that V(c) = V(¢c ); see
below the discussion of Proposition 8.
The remainder of parts (b) and (c) are obvious, on examination of Table 2 and equations (22).
Remarks. In economic terms, the above Theorem, together with Propositions 4 , 5 and 6
above, implies the following:
· The very first generation will never start a stock market in long lived capital (SM), nor an
intragenerationally autarkic bank (B).
· The slowest turnpike transition path (TIB) to steady state (Golden Rule) intergenerational
banking would survive (continue) at time  t  if either it is a dominant strategy  for both new
born and middle aged at time  t or, at least, the middle aged at time  t  can credibly resist a
switch to the (steady state, non-periodic) stock market (SM) at time t, by threatening to
revert to their intragenerationally autarkic banking allocation (B).
· In particular, the most desirable steady state outcome (the Golden Rule supported by
intergenerational banking, IB) will be reached when people are sufficiently risk averse and
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are not too likely to require early utilization of their savings (or liquidity), so that Only the
Meek Shall Inherit the Golden Rule steady state!
For the TIB path to be maintained, we must have that it is also an equilibrium outcome
of the intergenerational proposal games at all dates along the accumulation path, until the
switch to the  Golden Rule steady state can actually take place. We conclude this section by
showing  that if { }SM SM, is not a Nash equilibrium outcome in the initial stage game, it will
continue not to be so for all intergenerational stage games along the accumulation path in a
wide class of cases. We do this in the following Proposition 8, which serves to justify the
assumption that V(c) = V(¢c ), which was used in the proof of the Theorem above. Then,
given V(c) = V(¢c ), the proof of the Theorem also applies in al  stage games). Furthermore,
the same quilibrium outcome would arise in all current and subsequent stages.
The thrust of our argument is the following. Assume TIB to be the unique Nash
equilibrium outcome in the first stage intergenerational proposal game. Then in cases (b.1.1)
and (c.1.1) of the preceding Theorem it will clearly continue to be the chosen equilibrium over
time, since the terms of choice between TIB and competing mechanisms will be invariant
across stage games, even as capital accumulation proceeds along the transition path. In the
other cases, where the new born might prefer a move to SM, but the middle-aged can credibly
resist such a proposal in the first stage of the game, by credibly threatening to revert to the
intragenerationally autarkic allocation B, then the terms of this choice will change as capital
accumulation proceeds along TIB. We can still prove, for the class of homothetic
(instantaneous) tility functions, that  this credible threat to revert to  B  will persist along the
accumulation path. We can thus state that:
Proposition 8.  If TIB is a (Nash, and SPE or TPE) equilibrium allocation in the first stage of
the intergenerational proposal game, it will continue to be an equilibrium allocation at all
subsequent stage games, for t ³ 2, for all homothetic U C
C
( ) ,=
-
>
-1
1
0
r
r
r .
Proof. See Bhattacharya, Fulghieri and Rovelli [1997].
Remark. Given Proposition 8 and our main Theorem, and definitions (22.a, b),  V(¢c ) =
V(c) holds true for continuation payoffs  if:  [ ] [ ]V H V MA HB SM1 11 0 1 0= > =( , ) ( ) ( , ) .
Alternatively, suppose [ ] [ ]V H V MA HB SM1 110 1 0= < =( , ) ( ) ( , )  ,  but still  {SM, SM } is
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not the unique Trembling-Hand Perfect SSM  at time  t=1  in case C (simultaneous proposals)
because, by hypothesis, V(¢c ) > V(c). But  then {TIB, TIB} must also be in SSM (t+1)
because V(¢c ) > V(c) will continue to hold also at time t = 2, in light of the proof of
Proposition 8. But then it contradicts the definition of V(c) in  (22.a, b) to assume that V(¢c )
¹ V(c)  at  t=1.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper we have attempted to extend and synthesize the extant and emerging
theoretical frameworks pertaining to (a) static liquidity sharing (consumption smoothing)
mechanisms, (b) intergenerational (OLG)  tradeoffs and modifications to these, in and out of
steady states, and  (c) non-cooperative intergenerational proposal games related to Sustainable
Mechanisms or Institutions in these settings. Our results show that, if currently young
generations are constrained to be “minimally altruistic” towards their descendants  (i.e., not to
do relative harm to them) in their “feasible” (allowed) proposals, then transition to the long-run
optimal Golden Rule of Phelps [1961] outcome may be obtained as the unique non-cooperative
equilibrium outcome among generations, but only if the agents involved have preferences
embodying a significant degree of relative risk aversion, or  curvature in the (additive) utility
functions for consumption at different points of their stochastic lifespans, and also relatively
low likelihood of liquidity or early withdrawal needs. By embodying  such a reasonably
restricted notion of intergenerational “autonomy”, we have improved on the essentially
planning-theoretic modeling of, for example, Allen and Gale [1995], and also enriched (in
context) the methodology of Esteban and Sakovics [1993], obtaining quite different results vis-
à-vis the universality of long-run efficiency attainment.
Our model may also be usefully compared to that of Boldrin and Rustichini [1995]: with
no long-lived capital and, hence, no transfer of property rights to capital across generations
taking place, they find that whether or not PAYG Social Security (intergenerational transfer)
systems are voted into existence (and maintained) depends on the return to capital and the
dynamics of stochastic population growth (a high rate of growth will favor the adoption of a
PAYG system)14. Keeping in mind that both our transition path to intergenerational banking
(TIB) and also the intergenerational banking steady state (IB) share an essential similarity with
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PAYG systems, our results point to the fact that whether or not a PAYG outcome will be
chosen, in an environment with long lived capital stock and stochastic lifetimes, may al o
depend on the extent of agents’ aversion to risk and random needs for early withdrawal or
liquidity. A synthesis of these two types of modeling, with roles for both endogenous trade or
exchange of property rights to capital and for aggregate shocks to state variables pertaining to
(i) agents’ (preference) characteristics, (ii) demographic changes, and (iii) return to capital,
should help provide important and policy-relevant answers to intriguing economic questions
regarding the nature and efficiency of equilibrium financial intermediation and social security
systems.
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ENDNOTES
Section I
1 The background assumption is that there are many small uninsurable risks, to
endowments (such as accidents), health, or family size, for which it is extremely costly to
develop separate insurance markets, in part due to private observability of outcomes, which
could be monitored by insurers only at a prohibitive cost. The lack of such markets gives rise
to uncertain indirect utility functions for agents, over their intertemporal withdrawal patterns
from their invested savings.
2 In Bhattacharya and Gale [1987] it is shown that the opening of an interim st ck market
in the Diamond - Dybvig [1983] model leads to over investment, relative to the ex ante optimal
level, in the long-term technology, when agents have relative risk aversion greater than unity
and they make investment choices individually. See Bhattacharya and Padilla [1996] for further
discussion of these contrasting results, which arise from the dominance of different incomplete
markets effects, within and across generations.
3 The obvious reason is that each subcoalition of current and future generations has an
incentive to deviate from the Golden Rule allocation, by denying the anticipated positive old-
age transfer to the immediately prior generation, when each generation's endowment pattern is
tilted towards its youth.
4 Hence, the reliance on intra-generational mechanisms in an OLG context, as in
Bencivenga and Smith [1991] and others, appears to be not very well justified.
5 In addition, we also show the existence of a steady-state periodic stock market
equilibrium.
6 Hence, our results differ from those of Esteban and Sakovics [1993] in their simpler
“transfer games” context (with no endogenous real investments), in which - as the cost of
making new proposals goes to zero - they obtain nearly efficient steady-state outcomes as
unique equilibria.
Section II
7 The assumption that  Q = 1 is used by Diamond and Dybvig [1983] to prove the
existence of Panic Bank Runs, of early withdrawals for storage at (t+1) by agents who do not
wish to consume from savings until time (t+2). However, simple measures, such as suspension
of convertibility, can eliminate such Runs, so we ignore this problem. This assumption
considerably simplifies the analysis of transitions to optimal Steady-State allocations.
8 This intragenerational optimal allocation  (B) is the unique equilibrium outcome of such a
contract if banks can suspend early withdrawal rights once a proportion of their depositors
has been withdrawn (that is, a fraction L  of their investments has been liquidated). All agents
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would then deposit all their initial endowments in such banks, and not invest in real investments
on their own. They would also withdraw early if and only if they are early diers.
Section III
9 One may think of a 40 year period as made up of ages 40 to 80, so that a (disabled)
individual may take early retirement at the age of 60, or continue working until 80 and then
enjoy an increased level of consumption, with both dying soon after retirement.
10 In thinking of VB as the outside option of the currently middle-aged, when the next
generation proposes a transition to SM, we are implicitly assuming that intragenerational
solidarity among the middle-aged is present (or, more plausibly, that times of death are
unresolved for them) when the next generation proposes.
11 In contemplating these transitions, we are not allowing the middle-aged generation to do
both the constrained trading with the young, and also further within-generation risk-sharing as
in (B); otherwise, VSM(MA) would always exceed VB. Our rationale is that we think of the
SM-mechanism as being more individually decentralised than either B or TIB, which require
intragenerational coordination at least. If, on the other hand, the middle-aged could renegotiate
(B) among themselves, the economy would shift to SM (following a proposal from the new
born) whenever ( )V NB VSM TIB> .
Section IV .
12 For example, generation 1 could offer to buy e units of real, one-period old investments
from generation 0 at time t = 1, at unit price, and invest the remainder of its endowment (1-e)
in real investments, thus guaranteeing its arly and late diers consumption levels of {C1,1  = R ,
C1,2 = R }. Generation 0 would not have a better outside option (as this would involve
physical liquidation) and generation 2 would be strictly  worse off than generation 1.
13 In other words, we are analyzing cases in which the new born  at  t  do not “go along
with” the middle aged, on {TIB, TIB}, just to acquire Ht+1 > 1  to do better in a move to SM,
i.e. for [VSM(MA) ½ Ht+1  ] , at the next stage (t+1) game.
Section V
14 In common with our model and Esteban and Sacovics [1993], Boldrin and Rustichini
[1995] also assume that a proposed social security transfer to the old embodies in it the same
proportional transfers to the current young when they would be old (unless this is then
modified by a new proposal by the then young agents).
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